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Sentencing for the ‘Crime
of Crimes’
The Evolving ‘Common Law’of Sentencing of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
Robert D. Sloane*

Abstract
Absent much prescriptive guidance in its Statute or other positive law,
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has been developing,
in effect, a ‘common law’ of sentencing for the most serious international crimes:
genocide and crimes against humanity. While it remains, as the Appeals Chamber
has said, ‘premature to speak of an emerging ‘‘penal regime’’, and the coherence
in sentencing practice that this denotes’, this comment offers some preliminary
reflections on the substantive law and process of sentencing as it has evolved through
ICTR practice. Above all, the author argues, sentencing must, but has not yet,
become an integral part of international criminal justice rather than, as it
has historically been treated, an ‘afterthought’. The lack of sufficient attention to
sentencing, evident procedurally in the ICTR’s abandonment of distinct sentencing
hearings and the expedient of ‘transactional sentencing’, at times manifests itself
in perfunctory sentencing analyses and jurisprudential confusion over the
proper role of ostensible sentencing factors including ‘gravity of the offence’, ‘zeal’,
‘heinous means’, ‘prior good character’ and ‘voluntary commission’. Because of the
inherent gravity of the crimes, the ICTR’s lack of adequate attention to sentencing
has not, by and large, led it to impose quantitatively incorrect sentences. But qualitatively, neglect of sentencing inhibits the ‘common law’ evolution of a mature
penal jurisprudence that can contribute to the long-term normative goals of
international justice.
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1. Introduction
How should we sentence the perpetrators of the most unambiguous case
of genocide since the Holocaust?1 To ask this question begs a host of others:
that we know who ‘we’ is, presumably the elusive international community;
that this community has the right, or perhaps the duty, to punish under these
circumstances; that the criminal justice model can and should be applied
to conduct implicating hundreds of thousands of perpetrators, perhaps as
many as one-third of Rwanda’s adult population at the time;2 and that jurists
can meaningfully distinguish more from less culpable cases of the ‘crime
of crimes’.3 But the Security Council implicitly, for all practical purposes,
presumed affirmative answers to these questions, when it established the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR or Tribunal) and invested
it with a Statute with mandatory, if skeletal, sentencing provisions.4 For more
than a decade now, the ICTR has therefore struggled, with scant precedential
guidance,5 to determine appropriate and just sentences for unconscionable
acts that strain our moral intuitions and often lie, in the Tribunal’s words,
‘beyond human comprehension’.6
The scale7 and inherently abhorrent nature of the crimes of conviction
renders such familiar sentencing concepts as gradation, proportionality and
aggravating and mitigating circumstances difficult to apprehend. Yet the
Statute offers the Tribunal little sentencing guidance. It limits penalties
to incarceration, thereby implicitly excluding capital punishment; includes
a renvoi to Rwandan practice; requires consideration of ‘the gravity of the
offence’ and ‘the individual circumstances of the convicted person’; and
1 P. Gourevitch, We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed with our families (New York:
Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1998), 170.
2 W.A. Schabas, ‘Genocide Trials and Gacaca Courts’, 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice
(JICJ) (2005) 879^895, at 881^882.
3 Several scholars question these assumptions. With particular reference to Rwanda, see
J.E. Alvarez, ‘Crimes of State/Crimes of Hate: Lessons From Rwanda’, 24 Yale Journal of
International Law (1999) 365^483. For the author’s views, see R.D. Sloane, ‘The Expressive
Capacity of International Punishment’, 43 Stanford Journal of International Law (2007) 39^94.
See also, I. Tallgren, ‘The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law’, 13 European
Journal of International Law (2002) 561^595.
4 SC Res. 955, 8 November 1994 (establishing the Tribunal and its Statute). For a history of the
circumstances culminating in the Statute’s adoption, see P. Akhavan, ‘The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment’, 90 American
Journal of International Law (1996) 501^510.
5 See W.A. Schabas, ‘International Sentencing: From Leipzig (1923) to Arusha (1996)’, in
M.C. Bassiouni (ed.), International Criminal Law, Vol. III (2nd edn., New York: Transnational
Publishers, 1999), 171^193, at 171 (emphasizing that ‘[i]nternational law has rarely accorded
more than summary consideration to the issue of sentencing’).
6 Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber, 21 May 1999, x 9.
7 The genocide literally decimated Rwanda’s population. Gourevitch, supra note 1, at 3. No fewer
than 500,000, and by some accounts as many as 800,000, Tutsi and moderate Hutu were
slaughtered during a period of about 100 days. See A. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story:
Genocide in Rwanda (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), 16; I. Carlsson, ‘The UN
Inadequacies’, 4 JICJ (2005) 837^846, at 841.
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authorizes restitution.8 The Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE of ‘the
Rules’) augment this framework in abstract and relatively uninformative
terms. They instruct the Tribunal to consider aggravating and mitigating
factors, but with few exceptions, do not specify which factors might so qualify.9
Absent prescriptive guidance, the ICTR has thus been developing, in effect, a
‘common law’of sentencing for genocide and crimes against humanity.10 While
a more structured positive framework may well be appropriate for the ICC and
for hybrid courts, which generally should hew more closely to a national penal
jurisprudence, the drafters of the ICTR Statute were probably wise (assuming
they did it deliberately) to leave the details of sentencing to be worked out
judicially. Absent any real precedent on sentencing for genocide and crimes
against humanity, judges immersed in the morally and factually Byzantine
details of concrete cases arising out of the Rwandan genocide and civil war
were (and remain) far better situated to the task than diplomats and others
acting in legislative fora.
On 21 July 2000, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) remarked that it would be ‘premature
to speak of an emerging ‘‘penal regime’’, and the coherence in sentencing
practice that this denotes’.11 Despite scores of sentences delivered since then,12
this remark continues to apply with equal, if not greater, force to the
sentencing practices of the ICTR, which, as of early 2006, had issued

8 Art. 23 ICTRSt.
9 Rule 101 ICTR RPE. Rules 101(B)(ii) and (iv) specify, respectively, ‘substantial cooperation with
the Prosecutor’ and ‘the extent to which any penalty imposed by a court of any State on the
convicted person for the same act has already been served’ as mitigating factors, while Rule
101(B)(iii) refers the Tribunal to ‘[t]he general practice regarding prison sentences in the courts
of Rwanda’, including, presumably, aggravating and mitigating factors customarily considered
by those courts. Art. 6(4) of the Statute also authorizes the Tribunal to consider
‘superior orders’ in mitigation.
10 The Statute adopts the modern ç and by now almost surely the customary ç definition of
crimes against humanity, which no longer requires a nexus to armed conflict. Art. 3 ICTRSt.;
compare Art. 7 ICCSt. (no nexus requirement); see also, Decision on Defence Motion
for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Tadic¤ (IT-94-1), Appeals Chamber, 2 October 1995,
xx 140^141. This has proved significant, for while the civil war and the genocide raged
simultaneously, many atrocities could not have been readily connected, at least not
in a ‘direct’, legally sufficient way, to the interim regime’s armed conflict with the RPF;
hence the ICTR has acquitted several defendants of war crimes for want of adequate proof of
their connection to the interim government’s forces, but convicted them of crimes
against humanity. E.g. Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber,
21 May 1999, xx 600^624; Judgment and Sentence, Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3), Trial Chamber,
6 December 1999, xx 442^443 (acquitting Rutaganda of war crimes despite his authority over
the Interahamwe and rejecting an ‘ipso facto’ legally sufficient link between the genocide and
the armed conflict).
11 Judgment and Sentence, Furundz› ija (IT-95-17/1), Appeals Chamber, 21 July 2000, x237.
12 By 2004, the ICTR and ICTY had together issued almost 70 sentences. M. Drumbl, ‘Collective
Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity’, 99 Northwestern
University Law Review (2005) 539^610, at 556.
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27 sentences,13 seven of which remained on appeal.14 Nonetheless, with a view
to the ultimate need for the international criminal justice system to develop
a coherent, relatively uniform, sentencing regime, this comment offers
some preliminary reflections on the ICTR’s sentencing jurisprudence.
Even at this comparatively early stage in the resurgence and evolution of
international criminal law that followed the end of the Cold War, several
patterns have emerged that merit appraisal ç for the practices of the ICTY,
the ICTR and hybrid tribunals will undoubtedly and significantly influence
those of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC), which, as of
this writing, had recently obtained custody and confirmed the charges
instituted against its first indictee, the Congolese national Thomas Lubanga
Dyilo.15

2. Beyond Sentencing as an ‘Afterthought’
Of the 27 convicted persons sentenced as of April 2007, 12 had been sentenced
to life imprisonment; two to a term of 35 years; five to 25 years; two to 15 years;
two to 6 years; and the others to terms of 7, 10, 12, 27 and 45 years,
respectively. Of course, this kind of quantitative compilation tells us little
about the ICTR’s practices. To understand how the Tribunal has tried to reach
‘appropriate’ sentences for abhorrent crimes that defy the moral imagination
requires analysis of its written reasons for judgment. Regrettably, this is itself
an area in which the sentencing practices of the Tribunal could stand improvement. Too often, that portion of the judgment explaining the sentence appears
to be little more than an ‘afterthought’16 to the hundreds of paragraphs devoted
not only to essential legal analysis and factual findings, but to lengthy descriptions of the general background to the genocide and needlessly detailed
summaries of each side’s arguments. The few paragraphs devoted to sentencing
analysis tend to be highly formulaic, even perfunctory.
In general, they recite the crimes of conviction; emphasize their gravity; list,
without elaboration, the conventional goals of punishment; set out the relevant
portions of the Statute and Rules; reference Rwandan law to confirm that
it has been ‘duly considered’; note the duty to individualize sentences, taking
account of aggravating and mitigating circumstances; list those circumstances;
and then pronounce the sentence, often offering no more by way of analysis
13 Virtually all of these sentences have been for genocide or crimes against humanity. As of
April 2007, the ICTR had only sentenced two defendants for war crimes. Judgment and
Sentence, Ntagerura, Bagambiki, and Imanishimwe (ICTR-99-46), Trial Chamber, 25 February
2004, x 826; Judgment, Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3-A), Appeals Chamber 26 May 2003, x 584.
14 ICTR, Status of Cases, available online at http://65.18.216.88/default.htm (visited 27 March
2006).
15 Constitution of Trial Chamber I, Press Release ICC-CPI-20070307-210-En, 7 March 2007;
First Arrest for the International Criminal Court, Press Release ICC-CPI-20060302-125-En,
17 March 2006.
16 Schabas, supra note 5, at 171.
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(particularly where, as is frequently the case, the sentence is life imprisonment) than a variant of this conclusory statement: ‘Having reviewed both mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the Chamber finds that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances in the Accused’s case.’17
Sometimes, perhaps, this suffices. Crimes committed by elites for whom
there is little or nothing to be said in mitigation and much to be said in
aggravation undoubtedly should be punished by the most severe penalty
authorized by the Statute, life incarceration, and the ‘why’ may seem intuitive
or self-evident. Consider Mikaeli Muhimana. As conseiller of the Gishyita
commune, he ‘occupied a position of influence in the community’.18
Rather than use his position to prevent harm, he participated zealously in
attacks on Tutsis seeking refuge in his commune’s churches and hospitals,
raping and killing, among others, a 15 year-old-girl.19 The Tribunal emphasized
an abhorrent ‘incident where the Accused used a machete to cut [a] pregnant
woman . . . from her breasts down to her genitals and remove her baby,
who cried for some time before dying. After disembowelling the woman, the
assailants accompanying Muhimana cut off her arms and stuck sharpened
sticks into them.’20 Finding no mitigation, the Trial Chamber sentenced
Muhimana to three concurrent life terms.21
Yet however horrible the crime, however self-evident it may seem that
anything less than life incarceration would be an insult to the victims and
a mockery of the international criminal justice system,22 the absence of much
in the way of substantive analysis impedes the development of a sentencing
jurisprudence, which, in the long term, will be indispensable to that system.
For this reason, it is unfortunate that several Trial Chambers have adopted, and
the Appeals Chamber has embraced, the practice of ‘transactional’ or ‘global’
sentencing: imposing one sentence for multiple crimes that belong to the same
criminal ‘transaction’.23 While perhaps expedient, this practice, as the
17 Judgment and Sentence, Niyitegeka (ICTR-96-14), Trial Chamber, 16 May 2003, x500; see also,
e.g. Judgment and Sentence, Musema (ICTR-96-13), Trial Chamber, 27 January 2000, x1008;
Judgment and Sentence, Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3), Trial Chamber, 6 December 1999, x473;
compare Judgment and Sentence, Simba (ICTR-01-76), Trial Chamber, 13 December 2005, x443
(‘In the Chamber’s view, after weighing the gravity of the crime and the circumstances of the
Accused, limited mitigation is warranted.’).
18 Judgment and Sentence, Muhimana (ICTR-95-1B), Trial Chamber, 28 April 2005, x604.
19 Ibid., xx604^607.
20 Ibid., x612.
21 Ibid., x618.
22 Hannah Arendt, expressing a sentiment equally applicable to most crimes committed during
the Rwandan genocide, wrote that ‘[i]t may well be essential to hang Go«ring, but it is totally
inadequate. That is, this guilt, in contrast to all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and
all legal systems.’ G.J. Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crimes Tribunals
(New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), 13.
23 E.g. Judgment and Sentence, Niyitegeka (ICTR-96-14), Trial Chamber, 16 May 2003, x483; see
Judgment, Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Appeals Chamber, 19 October 2000, xx100^113 (affirming
the Trial Chamber’s discretion to impose a single sentence for all convictions ‘where the crimes
ascribed to the accused, regardless of their characterization, form part of a single set of crimes
committed in a given geographic region during a specific time period’).
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Trial Chamber in Imanishimwe said, ‘makes it difficult to determine the range
of sentences for each specific crime’.24
Greater use of comparative analysis would likewise contribute to the
development of a fair, uniform, and coherent penal jurisprudence.
The Tribunal has consistently ç and, I think, correctly ç rejected the
argument that a defendant merits a lower sentence because others convicted
of similar crimes under allegedly similar circumstances received lower
sentences. In Musema, for instance, the defendant, who had been convicted
after a trial of genocide and two counts of crimes against humanity (extermination and rape), argued that his life sentence should be reduced as manifestly
disproportionate to that of Serushago, who had been convicted following
a guilty plea of genocide and three counts of crimes against humanity
(extermination, murder and torture) but received a 15-year sentence.25
The Appeals Chamber cited the Delalic¤ and others case (also known as ‘C›elebic› i
case’) for the general proposition that comparisons offer ‘‘‘limited assistance,’’’
for ‘while ‘‘two accused convicted of similar crimes under similar circumstances should not in practice receive very different sentences, often the
differences are more significant than the similarities, and the mitigating and
aggravating factors dictate different results’’’.26 It then rejected as ‘superficial’
the bases of comparison asserted by Musema and distinguished his culpability
from Serushago’s based on a variety of aggravating and mitigating factors.27
Though seldom, at least so far,28 availing to defendants, comparative analysis enriches the penal jurisprudence. It compels the Tribunal to explain and
justify, which of the infinite number and variety of individual circumstances
may be relevant to sentencing, when and why. The truism that no two
cases can be deemed precisely alike and the ‘over-riding obligation’
of the Trial Chambers ‘to tailor a penalty to fit the individual circumstances of the accused’, therefore should not become reasons to avoid
24 Judgment and Sentence, Ntagerura, Bagambiki, and Imanishimwe (ICTR-99-46), Trial Chamber,
25 February 2004, x812.
25 Judgment, Musema (ICTR-96-13), Appeals Chamber, 16 November 2001, x385.
26 Ibid., x387 (quoting Judgment, Delalic¤ and others (IT-96-21), Appeals Chamber, 20 February
2001, x719); see also Judgment, Kamuhanda (ICTR-99-54), Appeals Chamber, 19 September
2005, xx361^362.
27 Ibid., xx388^390. Similarly, in Serushago itself, the Appeals Chamber found the defendant’s effort
to compare his sentence (15 years) to that of Drazen Erdemovic¤ (5 years), on the grounds that
both had confessed and pled guilty, unpersuasive, largely because Erdemovic¤ had acted under
duress, namely, a direct threat to his life if he refused to participate in a massacre of Bosnian
Muslims. Reasons for Judgment, Serushago (ICTR-98-39), Appeals Chamber, 6 April 2000, x27.
By contrast, in Ntakirutimana, the Trial Chamber found comparative analysis relevant to
reaching an appropriate sentence for Ge¤rard, but not Elizaphan, Ntakirutimana. Judgment
and Sentence, Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17), Trial Chamber,
21 February 2003, xx914^916 (drawing guidance from the circumstances of and sentences
imposed on Kayishema, Musema, and Ruzindana); see also Judgment, Kayishema and
Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber, 21 May 1999, x26 (comparing the culpability of the two
defendants relative to one another).
28 As a genuine jurisprudence of sentencing by international tribunals develops, the potential for
successful challenges based on comparison will presumably increase.
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comparative analysis.29 Even where it will not, in the Tribunal’s view,
ultimately affect a defendant’s sentence, engaging in the exercise may well pay
long-term dividends. Not only does it offer guidance in future cases, it helps
to work out incrementally, by the ‘common law’ method, the contours of unwarranted disparity ç a concept indispensable to the fair and coherent sentencing
regime to which international tribunals like the ICTR should aspire.

3. A ‘Common Law’ of Sentencing for Genocide and
Crimes Against Humanity
Notwithstanding these reflections and the imperative to move beyond
sentencing as a mere ‘afterthought’, the ICTR has not, of course, neglected its
sentencing mandate; it has done a far better job than its predecessors in this
regard.30 Four components of the ICTR’s construction of its statutory mandate
and consequent evolution of a ‘common law’ of sentencing merit particular
examination: (i) the renvoi to Rwandan law but simultaneous exclusion
of capital punishment, which Rwandan law authorizes; (ii) the dual sentencing
metrics established by the Statute, ‘gravity’ and ‘individual circumstances’;
(iii) aggravating and mitigating circumstances, which, with few exceptions,
neither the Statute nor the Rules specify; and (iv) appellate review.
A. Recourse to the Rwandan Practice
Article 23 of the ICTR Statute limits penalties to incarceration, thereby
implicitly excluding the death penalty, and instructs the Trial Chambers
‘to have recourse to the general practice regarding prison sentences in the
courts of Rwanda’.31 This exclusion, despite Rwanda’s intense opposition to it
during the Security Council debates culminating in establishment of the
Tribunal,32 leads to an oft-noted and, to many minds, perverse disparity:
the elites who orchestrated the genocide escape a potential death sentence
and get to serve their sentences in facilities that conform to modern international human rights standards, while the (presumably less culpable) rank and
29 Judgment, Kamuhanda (ICTR-99-54), Appeals Chamber, 19 September 2005, x361 (internal
quotation marks omitted); Judgment and Sentence, Simba (ICTR-01-76), Trial Chamber,
13 December 2005, x432 (acknowledging that the ‘sentences of like individuals in like cases
should be comparable’ but noting that ‘any given case contains a multitude of variables,
ranging from the number and type of crimes committed to the personal circumstances of the
individual’) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30 See A.M. Danner, ‘Constructing a Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law
Sentencing’, 87 Virginia Law Review (2001) 415^501, at 418 (‘The judgments from the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals span thousands of pages, but their sentences were given in
terse one-line declarations, with little or no explanation of the bases for the distinctions
between the various sentences imposed on the defendants.’); see also Schabas, supra note 5,
at 172^174.
31 Art. 23(1) ICTRSt. (emphasis added).
32 See UN SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., UN Doc. S/PV.3453, at 16.
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file languish for years in overcrowded jails, awaiting trial in Rwanda’s severely
backlogged national system ç only to then face death or imprisonment in
Rwandan prisons that fall far short of those standards.33
In practice, this criticism has turned out to be somewhat over-stated.
Post-genocide Rwanda, faced with the insuperable task of trying hundreds
of thousands of suspects in a state with, at the time, no functioning
judicial system and no more than a handful of lawyers, adopted Organic Law
No. 08/96.34 This law authorizes the death penalty only for the most culpable
‘Category I’ offenders, architects of the genocide and those responsible for
particularly awful or systematic murders; offenders in the remaining three
categories, in exchange for a plea, receive substantial sentence reductions.35
The Organic Law’s four-tier system (and its continuation in the subsequent
gacaca experiment), however imperfect, substantially obviates the worry that
low-level offenders will routinely be sentenced to death.36 Furthermore, while
ICTR convicts may be held in prisons that compare favourably to those of
Rwanda, the hyperbolic critique that they would therefore end up serving
their sentences in lavish prisons is inaccurate. Bilateral treaties entered into
by the Tribunal authorize the incarceration of convicted offenders in
Swaziland, France, Italy, Sweden, Mali and Benin, but the Tribunal has
expressed a preference that defendants be incarcerated, where possible,
in African states. Many are serving their sentences in Mali, which reportedly
suffers from poor prison conditions.37 Finally, and most significantly,
33 See e.g. W.A. Schabas, ‘Sentencing By International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach’,
7 Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law (1997) 461^517, at 478, 508; M.H. Morris,
‘The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda’, 7 Duke Journal of Comparative and
International Law (1997) 349^374, at 363^364.
34 Organic Law No. 08/96 of 30 August 1996 on the Organisation of Prosecutions for
Offences Constituting the Crime of Genocide or Crimes against Humanity committed since
1 October 1990, J.O., 1996, Year 35, No. 17, at 14.
35 See Schabas, supra note 2, at 885. In fact, for this reason, offenders prosecuted by the ICTR
who would otherwise fall within Categories 2 or 3 ç those responsible for ‘intentional
homicide or of serious assault against the person causing death’ or for ‘other serious assaults
[not causing death]’, respectively ç probably receive higher sentences than they would
were they prosecuted by national courts. The Rwandan law stipulates a term of between
7 and 15 years, depending on the circumstances, for Category 2 offenders, and a term of
shorter duration for Category 3 offenders. Judgment and Sentence, Ruggiu (ICTR-97-32),
Trial Chamber, 1 June 2000, xx28^30.
36 The gacaca courts, established in 2001, lack jurisdiction over Category 1 offenders. Schabas,
supra note 2 at 893; see also ibid., at 895 (observing that despite the death penalty’s authorization for Category 1 offenders, in practice, no execution has been carried out since April 1998).
37 See US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Mali (Washington, D.C.:
US Government Printing Office, 2006), x1(c). From one perspective, as critics say, it is perverse
that the most culpable elites may escape capital punishment and the egregious prison conditions to which other, less culpable, defendants may be exposed. But it would surely be equally if
not more perverse deliberately to sentence offenders convicted by the ICTR to substandard
prison conditions to remedy this disparity. Any such practice would undermine the international criminal justice system’s global legitimacy and normative goals, including its synergy
with international human rights law and that law’s aspiration to establish universal minimum
standards for humane incarceration.
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the Tribunal has reduced the disparity that matters most: many elites who
bear the greatest responsibility for the genocide would almost certainly
have escaped apprehension, trial, and punishment altogether absent the
ICTR.38
Relative to incarceration, the effects of the renvoi to Rwandan practice have
also been negligible. The Rwandan Penal Code prescribes death for crimes
comparable to those within the ICTR’s jurisdiction but instructs that, absent
the imposition of a life sentence, which it authorizes for the most
serious crimes, including murder, the maximum punishment shall be
20 years’ imprisonment (or 30 in the case of concurrent offences).39 Given the
inherent gravity of genocide and crimes against humanity, however, this
framework, even were it applied stringently, would rarely limit the Tribunal’s
discretion; and the Appeals Chamber established early in its jurisprudence that
while the ICTR Trial Chambers must consider Rwandan practice, it does
not bind them.40 A review of ICTR sentences to date suggests that Rwandan
law seldom plays more than a perfunctory role in sentencing. Typically, the
Trial Chambers invoke it to confirm the propriety of a sentence determined
otherwise.41
The Tribunal routinely cites Rwandan Organic Law No. 8/96 in support of its
own decisions.42 This is not objectionable, and indeed, may well be prudent, for
it would presumably tend to reduce perceived disparity between sentences

38 E. Mse, ‘Main Achievements of the ICTR’, 3 JICJ (2005) 920^943, at 932 (emphasizing that
‘[m]ost of the more than 60 accused persons, who fled Rwanda in 1994, would not have been
brought to justice had it not been for the Tribunal’s investigations, insistence upon their arrest
and subsequent requests for transfer to Arusha,’ and furthermore, that ‘[t]he fact that the
accused will receive a fair trial by an independent Tribunal has facilitated and, in many
instances, probably been a condition of transfer to Arusha’ given the extradition standards of
many states).
39 Judgment and Sentence, Semanza (ICTR-97-20), Trial Chamber, 15 May 2003, x561.
40 Judgment and Sentence, Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Trial Chamber, 4 September 1998, x23; see
also Judgment, Semanza (ICTR-97-20), Appeals Chamber, 20 May 2005, xx345, 376^378;
Reasons for Judgment, Serushago (ICTR-98-39), Appeals Chamber, 6 April 2000, x30.
41 E.g. Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber, 21 May 1999, x7; see also
Judgment and Sentence, Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Trial Chamber, 4 September 1998, x18
(affirming that ‘Rwanda, like all States which have incorporated crimes against humanity or
genocide in their domestic legislation, has envisaged the most severe penalties in the criminal
legislation for these crimes’); see also ibid., xx24^25. Kambanda, however, may be one of the
few cases in which Rwandan law arguably did affect the defendant’s sentence. While
Rule 101(B)(ii) of the Rules authorizes mitigation for substantial cooperation, including
a guilty plea, Kambanda received a life sentence nonetheless ç in part, surely, because of the
gravity of his crimes but perhaps also because under the Rwandan Organic Law, ‘Category I’
offenders, such as Kambanda, ‘cannot benefit from a reduction of sentences even after a guilty
plea’. Ibid., x37.
42 S. Beresford, ‘Unshackling the Paper Tiger ç The Sentencing Practices of the Ad Hoc Criminal
Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda’, 1 International Criminal Law Review (2001)
33^90, at 48^49; see e.g. Judgment and Sentence, Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Trial Chamber,
4 September 1998, xx27, 37; Judgment and Sentence, Ruggiu (ICTR-97-32), Trial Chamber,
1 June 2000, xx28^31.
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imposed by the ICTR and Rwandan courts. Yet it is questionable whether the
renvoi to Rwandan practice prescribed by the Statute, which the drafters
included out of a conservative regard for the principle of legality (nulla poena
sine lege), should apply prospectively to laws enacted by Rwanda after the
ICTR’s creation. But again, even if theoretically questionable, the renvoi makes
little practical difference. No defendant could argue that pre-1994 Rwandan
law prescribed a less severe penalty for his conduct than that imposed by
the Tribunal.

B. Sentencing Metrics: Gravity and Individual Circumstances
Article 23(2) of the ICTR Statute sets out two principal, but not exhaustive,43
sentencing metrics: ‘gravity of the offence’ and ‘individual circumstances
of the convicted person’. The latter effectively means, or overlaps almost
entirely with, aggravating and mitigating circumstances under Rule 101.
At times, the Tribunal describes certain sentencing facts under the heading
‘individual circumstances’, but these serve no independent function in
the determination of sentence except in so far as the Tribunal finds them
to be aggravating or mitigating.44 ‘Gravity’, by contrast, does ç at least
in theory.
The Tribunal emphasizes gravity as its sentencing lodestar, ‘the litmus
test for the appropriate sentence’.45 In practice, however, it remains unclear
how much actual work the concept of gravity does in the determination
of sentence. Every act of genocide and virtually every act prosecuted under
the rubric of crimes against humanity (extermination, rape, murder, torture)
is extremely grave. Trial Chambers duly and invariably reiterate this at the
outset of their sentencing analyses. But the idea that ‘gravity of the offence’
functions as one of two principal determinants of the sentence, still less
the ‘litmus test’, seems to be a fiction. It does little more, in the vast majority
of cases, than establish a high baseline. The adjustments to and individualization of the sentence virtually all take place at the level of ‘individual
circumstances’.
From one perspective, then, the real role of ‘gravity of the offence’ is minimal
or largely rhetorical. From another, however, it emerges as a frequent source of
jurisprudential confusion ç for several reasons: First, sometimes it appears to
overlap with an element of the substantive crime. In Kambanda, for example,
43 The Trial Chambers enjoy ‘unfettered discretion’ to individualize the penalty in view of the
totality of the circumstances. Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber,
21 May 1999, xx3^4.
44 Ibid, xx10^23.
45 Judgment, Akayesu (ICTR-96-4), Appeals Chamber, 1 June 2001, x413 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Judgment and Sentence, Kamuhanda (ICTR-95-54), Trial Chamber, 22 January
2004, x765 (emphasizing that ‘the penalty must first and foremost be commensurate to the
gravity of the offence’); Judgment and Sentence, Kajelijeli (ICTR-98-44), Trial Chamber,
1 December 2003, x963 (same).
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the Trial Chamber, speaking of genocide and crimes against humanity, stressed
the gravity of these crimes as an aggravating circumstance: ‘The magnitude
of the crimes, involving the killing of an estimated 500,000 civilians in
Rwanda, in a short span of 100 days, constitutes an aggravating fact.’46 But as
the Trial Chamber in Semanza observed, because ‘the number of victims is an
element of extermination as a crime against humanity,’ it may be considered
only ‘in assessing the gravity of the offence’; it should not then be doublecounted ‘as an aggravating factor in sentencing’.47
This observation points to a second, more general, problem. Kambanda and
virtually every ICTR sentencing decision manifest an unfortunate tendency
to conflate gravity as a statutory sentencing metric with gravity as an
aggravating circumstance, without clarifying the difference, if any, between
them ç or explaining whether and why gravity should be considered twice
in determining a convicted person’s sentence.48 Several Trial Chambers have
acknowledged this difficulty, emphasizing that given the inherent gravity of
‘[a]ll of the crimes in the Statute,’ it does not suffice to cite the ‘abstract gravity’
of the crime at the sentencing stage; rather, the Tribunal should ‘take into
account the particular circumstances of the case, as well as the form and
degree of the participation of the Accused’.49 But that is simply to say
that sentencing factors other than gravity must be considered, namely,
‘the individual circumstances of the convicted person’; it does not help to
define the independent role of gravity, as distinct from other factors, in the
determination of sentence. In fact, ‘gravity’ is not one concept but many. The
Tribunal cites it for different purposes and in different contexts, which the label
‘gravity’ tends to conflate and confuse, obscuring its proper role and limits in
determining sentences for the inherently grave crimes of genocide and
crimes against humanity.
One critical question that invites clarification, for example, is whether
‘gravity of the offence’ should be construed to focus the sentencing court’s
attention on the culpability of the actor or the consequences of his conduct
(the harm it causes), or both. If ‘gravity of the offence’ means something like
‘magnitude of the harm’, as some cases suggest,50 then genocide, crimes

46 Judgment and Sentence, Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Trial Chamber, 4 September 1998, x42.
47 Judgment and Sentence, Semanza (ICTR-97-20), Trial Chamber, 15 May 2003, x571. By contrast,
‘the number of victims may be an aggravating factor in relation to genocide, a crime with no
numeric minimum of victims’. Ibid.
48 E.g. Judgment and Sentence, Gacumbitsi (ICTR-01-64), Trial Chamber, 17 June 2004, x344.
In fact, at least one Trial Chamber, following the ICTY, has held expressly that ‘a particular
circumstance shall not be retained as aggravating if it is included as an element of the crime
in consideration’. Judgment and Sentence, Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (ICTR-96-10
& ICTR-96-17), Trial Chamber, 21 February 2003, x893.
49 Judgment and Sentence, Semanza (ICTR-97-20), Trial Chamber, 15 May 2003, x571; see also
Judgment and Sentence, Kajelijeli (ICTR-98-44), Trial Chamber, 1 December 2003, x953.
50 E.g. Judgment and Sentence, Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Trial Chamber, 4 September 1998, x42; cf.
Judgment and Sentence, Simba (ICTR-01-76), Trial Chamber, 13 December 2005, x440 (number
of victims as an aggravating circumstance).
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against humanity, and violations of Common Article 3 should be deemed
equally grave if they cause death or serious harm to an equal number
of victims, or if they result in roughly comparable suffering ç and
sentences for these crimes, all other factors being held constant, should not
be hierarchically graduated. But if gravity means culpability in a sense other or
more than a consequentialist one, then the dolus specialis of genocide ç to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group,
as such ç matters a great deal for purposes of assessing ‘gravity’ as it bears
on sentencing for the ‘crime of crimes’.51 Equally, it would ‘no doubt’ be true,
as the Kambanda decision stated, that ‘violations of Article 3 common to
the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocol II thereto’ should be
deemed ‘lesser crimes than genocide or crimes against humanity’.52 But unlike
the ICTY, which has decisively rejected the idea of a hierarchy of crimes,53 the
ICTR’s pronouncements on this issue remain in some tension with one
another.54
The ICTR has also had less of an opportunity than the ICTY to
focus on gradation in sentencing. Unlike the ICTY, which began with
the cases of low-ranking offenders like Tadic¤ and Erdemovic¤, from the
outset the ICTR has focused almost exclusively on the most senior, culpable
defendants, the architects, leaders and orchestrators. Hence, in theory,
the ICTR embraces the related principles that (i) sentences should be graduated to reflect distinctions between the elite and the rank and file;55 and
(ii) a life sentence ‘should be reserved for the most serious offenders’.56
In practice, as noted, almost half of those convicted to date have been
sentenced to a term of life, and most of the remainder to terms of 25 years
or more.

C. Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
Under Rule 101(B), the Tribunal must consider, in determining sentence,
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as well as Rwandan practice and
credit for time served elsewhere. The only such circumstance specified by the

51 Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber, 21 May 1999, x9.
52 Judgment and Sentence, Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Trial Chamber, 4 September 1998, x14.
53 Judgment, Tadic¤ (IT-94-1), Appeals Chamber, 26 January 2000, x69; but see ibid., (Separate
Opinion of Judge Cassese) (advocating the hierarchical view); see generally Danner, supra note
30 (urging adoption of the hierarchical view).
54 Compare Judgment and Sentence, Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Trial Chamber, 4 September 1998,
x 14, with Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Appeals Chamber, 1 June 2001, x367
(stating that ‘there is no hierarchy of crimes under the Statute’); see also Judgment and
Sentence, Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3), Trial Chamber, 6 December 1999, x450 (genocide and crimes
against humanity equally ‘shocking to the collective conscience’).
55 Judgment, Ntakirutimana (ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17), Appeals Chamber, 21 February 2003,
x 884; Judgment, Musema (ICTR-96-13), Appeals Chamber, 16 November 2001, x383.
56 Judgment and Sentence, Semanza (ICTR-97-20), Trial Chamber, 15 May 2003, x559.
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Rules, however, is ‘substantial cooperation with the Prosecutor’.57 The Statute
itself also provides that superior orders, while not exculpatory, ‘may be
considered in mitigation of punishment’.58 Otherwise, the Tribunal enjoys
unfettered discretion to decide what circumstances qualify as aggravating or
mitigating.59 Factors considered by the ICTY and the ICTR include, in aggravation, ‘leadership (superior) position of the accused, terrorizing victims, sadism,
cruelty and humiliation, espousal of ethnic and religious discrimination and
the number of victims’; and in mitigation, ‘superior orders, necessity, duress,
voluntary intoxication, automatism, insanity and self-defence,’ as well as
‘a guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility, remorse, voluntary surrender
to the tribunal(s), substantial cooperation with the prosecutor, post-conflict
conduct, previous good character, benevolent attitude toward the victims, and
age.’60 I will focus here on those factors that emerge as the most significant or
troubling in the ICTR’s practice.
At the outset, two points bear emphasis: First, because of the very high
baseline established by the gravity of the crimes of conviction (genocide and
most forms of crimes against humanity), it can be difficult to determine the
actual effect, if any, of certain aggravating factors. Often, the accused, an
architect or other elite who bears substantial responsibility for the genocide,
seems all but certain to receive a life sentence even in the absence of aggravating factors; hence the Appeals Chamber seldom disturbs the sentence
despite reversing or otherwise faulting the Trial Chamber’s findings
relevant to sentencing. In Kajelijeli, for example, the Appeals Chamber both
(i) overturned the Trial Chamber’s factual finding and, partly on this basis,
disagreed with its legal conclusion that Kajelijeli deserved no credit at all for
helping his wife to shelter several endangered Tutsis;61 and (ii) vacated
Kajelijeli’s convictions, in so far as they were based on superior responsibility,
for genocide and crimes against humanity (extermination).62 But it held that
57 Rule 101(B)(ii) ICTR RPE; Judgment, Kajelijeli (ICTR-98-44), Appeals Chamber, 23 May 2005,
x 294 (emphasizing that ‘a Trial Chamber is required to take into account any mitigating
circumstances in determining sentence’). Art. 23(1) of the Statute uses the mandatory ‘shall’
to instruct the Trial Chambers to limit penalties to imprisonment and take into account
Rwandan practice regarding prison sentences, but employs the more discretionary term
‘should’ in reference to the Art. 23(2) metrics: ‘gravity of the offence’ and ‘individual circumstances of the convicted person’. If this distinction ever had significance, Rule 101 eliminates it,
for it mandates that the Tribunal ‘shall take into account’ the metrics that Art. 23(2) says it
‘should take into account’.
58 Art. 6(4) ICTRSt.
59 Judgment, Kajelijeli (ICTR-98-44), Appeals Chamber, 23 May 2005, x294. Even conduct that
preceded the Tribunal’s temporal jurisdiction ç for example, saving the lives of Tutsis before
1994 ç may validly be taken into account at sentencing. Ibid., x298.
60 M.C. Bassiouni, An Introduction to International Criminal Law (New York: Transnational
Publishers, Inc., 2003), 327^328 (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted); see also
Beresford, supra note 42, at 53^82 (surveying penal jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for
Rwanda and Yugoslavia); Drumbl, supra note 12, at 561^566 (surveying aggravating and mitigating factors cited by international and hybrid criminal courts).
61 Judgment, Kajelijeli (ICTR-98-44), Appeals Chamber, 23 May 2005, x310.
62 Ibid., x316.
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neither of these errors called for reduction of Kajelijeli’s sentence given the
gravity of his crimes.63 Similarly, despite finding errors that required revisions
of the verdicts of both Ge¤rard and Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, the Appeals
Chamber affirmed their sentences.64 The actual effect of mitigating factors
cited by the Tribunal, therefore tends to be easier to ascertain.
Second, with respect to sentencing, the Tribunal has adopted a burden
of proof favourable to the defence: the Prosecution must prove aggravating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt; the defence need only establish
mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence.65 Again, this
makes it easier to discern the actual effect of mitigating factors.

1. Aggravating Circumstances
Without question, the paramount aggravating circumstance emphasized
by the Tribunal is the convicted person’s abuse of his political, military or
socioeconomic status and consequent betrayal of the trust of the victims,
to whom he owed a moral or legal duty. The Chambers characterize this
circumstance in different ways, but the basic idea is clear: ‘In determining the
appropriate sentence, a distinction is to be made between the individuals who
allowed themselves to be drawn into a maelstrom of violence, even reluctantly,
and those who initiated or aggravated it, and thereby more substantially
contributed to the overall harm.’66 Where the ICTR finds, as it often does, that
the defendant abused and manipulated his elite status and authority ç and
the associated trust of the general populace ç ‘this abuse of power and
betrayal of . . . high office constitutes the most significant aggravating factor’.67
Consider, for example, the Tribunal’s remarks in sentencing Eliezer Niyitegeka:
As a ‘well-known and influential figure’ in Kibuye, he ‘abused the trust placed
in him by the population,’ and ‘instead of promoting peace and reconciliation
in his capacity as Minister of Information, he turned to violence,’ directly
participating in (and influencing others to participate in) massacres, and
acting as a leader who gave orders to the perpetrators.68 This aggravating

63 See ibid., xx311, 319. The Appeals Chamber did, however, reduce Kajelijeli’s sentence from two
life sentences plus a term of 15 years to a single term of 45 years based on his unlawful
detention in Benin, which, it held, violated his rights to be notified promptly of the charges
and to enjoy a speedy first appearance. Ibid., xx323^324.
64 See Judgment, Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17), Appeals Chamber,
13 December 2004, xx554^570.
65 Judgment, Kajelijeli (ICTR-98-44), Appeals Chamber, 23 May 2005, x294; Judgment and
Sentence, Niyitigeka (ICTR-96-14), Trial Chamber, 16 May 2003, x488.
66 Judgment and Sentence, Krstic¤ (IT-98-33), Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, x 711; see also
Judgment, Musema (ICTR-96-13), Appeals Chamber, 16 November 2001, x383 (agreeing with
the ICTY ‘that the most senior members of the command structure, that is, the leaders and
planners of a particular conflict, should bear heavier criminal responsibility than those lower
down the scale, such as the foot soldiers carrying out the orders’).
67 Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber, 21 May 1999, x15.
68 Judgment and Sentence, Niyitigeka (ICTR-96-14), Trial Chamber, 16 May 2003, x499.
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circumstance extends not only to political and military69 leaders but to
persons who enjoyed high socioeconomic or professional status, such as
Ge¤rard Ntakirutimana (physician) and Alfred Musema (director of the Gisovu
Tea Factory).70 Countless other examples could be cited, but to convey the
significance of this aggravating factor, it suffices to note that, in one formulation or another (superior responsibility, high office, abuse of trust, leadership,
architect or organizer and so forth), it is difficult to locate a sentence in which
it has not been cited as an aggravating circumstance.71
Another prominent aggravating factor is the ‘enthusiasm’ or ‘zeal’ of
the perpetrator.72 (Conversely, reluctant participation in the offence may be
a mitigating factor.73) Despite its intuitive appeal, it is questionable whether
this factor reflects the expressive judgments that sentencing does and should
encode.74 Rank-and-file perpetrators may act with horrifying zeal in the midst
of an incited, perhaps drug- or alcohol-facilitated, killing frenzy. The elites who
incited the attacks may view atrocities with less emotion, instrumentally,
as a calculated means to reprehensible ends like greed or political power.
Of course, that may simply counsel using other aggravating factors to enhance
the latter’s penalties, rather than eliminating ‘zeal’ as a relevant factor. But it is
worth bearing in mind that zeal is not always, or even in most instances, more
culpable than emotionless orchestration of the crimes of conviction by elites,
who at times may well prefer to remain aloof from the actual atrocities.
The Trial Chamber in Nahimana wrote of the defendant, a former, renowned
history professor at the National University of Rwanda: ‘Without a firearm,
machete or any physical weapon, he caused the death of thousands of
innocent civilians.’75
69 Judgment and Sentence, Ntagerura, Bagambiki, and Imanishimwe (ICTR-99-46), Trial Chamber,
25 February 2004, x818.
70 Judgment and Sentence, Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17),
Trial Chamber, 21 February 2003, x910; Judgment and Sentence, Musema (ICTR-96-13), Trial
Chamber, 27 January 2000, xx999, 1002^1004.
71 It played no role ç indeed, the absence of authority functioned as a mitigating factor ç in
Ruggiu, a case involving a Belgian social worker and radio employee whom the Tribunal
said had fallen victim to the manipulation of senior figures. Judgment and Sentence,
Ruggiu (ICTR-97-32), Trial Chamber, 1 June 2000, xx61, 75^76.
72 Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Appeals Chamber, 1 June 2001, x361;
Judgment and Sentence, Niyitegeka (ICTR-96-14), Trial Chamber, 16 May 2003, x499(iv);
Judgment and Sentence, Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17),
Trial Chamber, 21 February 2003, x912.
73 Judgment and Sentence, Krstic¤ (IT-98-33), Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, x 711 (suggesting that
reluctant participation in the crimes may in some instances be considered as a mitigating
circumstance); see also Judgment and Sentence, Kamuhanda (ICTR-99-54), Trial Chamber
(Judge Maqutu’s Dissent on the Sentence), 22 January 2004, xx10^11 (advocating mitigation
because Kamuhanda only ‘went along with the genocide out of opportunism and because his
moral courage had deserted him’, and hence he ‘was probably reluctant to participate in the
genocide’).
74 Danner, supra note 30, at 419; see generally Sloane, supra note 3.
75 Judgment and Sentence, Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze (ICTR-99-52), Trial Chamber,
3 December 2003, x1099.
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Zeal frequently overlaps with the aggravating circumstance referred to as
‘heinous means’. It is difficult to identify an act of genocide or a crime against
humanity that is not ‘heinous’. Particularly voyeuristic descriptions of
the atrocities, however, seem to play a role ç at times explicitly, at times
tacitly ç in sentencing. Ruzindana, who likely received a 25-year sentence
rather than life imprisonment solely because the Tribunal tried him jointly
with and compared him at sentencing to Kayishema, a former prefect, offers
a particularly harrowing, but illustrative, example: the Chamber ‘recall[ed] the
vicious nature of the murder of a sixteen-year old girl named Beatrice.
Ruzindana ripped off her clothes and slowly cut off one of her breasts with
a machete. When he finished, he cut off her other breast while mockingly
telling her to look at the first one as it lay on the ground, and finally he
tore open her stomach.’76 At trial, far from expressing remorse, Ruzindana
‘smiled or laughed as survivors testified during trial’,77 also an aggravating
circumstance (i.e. post-genocide conduct of the accused) cited by the Tribunal
in some cases.
Now, it may be unobjectionable and not particularly controversial to
enhance a defendant’s sentence based on very ‘heinous means’.78 But mindful
of the inherent gravity of genocide and crimes against humanity, there may
also be an element of arbitrariness to this aggravating circumstance. It is
reminiscent of former US Supreme Court Justice Holmes’ visceral ‘puke test’
for determining whether a statute or other government conduct violates the
Constitution.79 This may work as well as any other proposed formula for
policing the elusive boundaries of substantive due process in US constitutional
law, but given the atrocious nature of the crimes tried by the ICTR and similar
tribunals, this test may not be particularly helpful as a circumstance that
purports to differentiate ‘ordinary’ genocidal rapes or murders from especially
culpable ones.
One final aggravating circumstance that merits attention here ç because it
seems so fundamentally misguided ç is ‘voluntary commission’. In Serushago,
the Trial Chamber found the defendant’s ‘[v]oluntary participation’ to be an
aggravating circumstance, by which it meant, in part, that he ‘committed
the crimes knowingly’.80 Another Chamber, relying on Serushago, said:
‘Both Kayishema and Ruzindana voluntarily committed and participated in
the offences and this represents one aggravating circumstance.’81 Needless to
say, had these defendants not acted voluntarily and knowingly, they could not
be guilty of either genocide or crimes against humanity. Voluntary or knowing
76 Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber, 27 May 1999, x18; compare
Judgment and Sentence, Muhimana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber, 28 April 2005, xx604^607.
77 Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber, 27 May 1999, x17.
78 The adjective ‘heinous’ modifies the manner of the killing, not the crime itself. Judgment,
Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Appeals Chamber, 1 June 2001, x350
79 M. De Wolfe Howe, Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes and Harold J.
Laski 1916-1935 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 888.
80 Sentence, Serushago (ICTR-98-39), Trial Chamber, 5 February 1999, x30.
81 Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Trial Chamber, 21 May 1999, x13.
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commission of the crimes manifestly is not an aggravating circumstance; it is
a condition of liability, an element of the offence. Regrettably, the Appeals
Chamber in Kayishema and Ruzindana chose to elide the issue on appeal, by
characterizing the Trial Chamber’s statement ç unpersuasively ç as a way of
‘focusing, not simply on the fact that these acts were committed voluntarily,
but also on the fact that they were committed with some element of zeal’.82
If that is indeed what the Trial Chamber meant, ‘voluntary participation’ was
a particularly inartful and unfortunate way to express it; the Appeals Chamber
should have taken the opportunity to clarify this issue in its decision.83

2. Mitigating Circumstances
Mitigation, the Tribunal has said, relates only to sentencing and does not
diminish the gravity of the offence.84 The mitigating factors it considers
fall into three categories: (i) pragmatic (voluntary surrender, guilty pleas and
substantial cooperation); (ii) moral or rehabilitative (remorse, sympathy for the
victims, rehabilitative potential, good character or prior acts) and (iii) clemency
(old age and frail health). Pragmatic factors involve recognition of the ICTR’s
resource constraints; they offer incentives to defendants that tend to facilitate
or expedite its work. In some cases, they may also reflect reduced culpability
insofar as a guilty plea, for example, may indicate contrition. Moral and
clemency factors, by contrast, involve judgments about the propriety or utility
of punishment. Unsurprisingly, given the inherent gravity of the crimes,
pragmatic factors prove the most significant in terms of their actual effect on
the sentence.
With one exception, the Tribunal has sentenced every defendant who has
not pled guilty to a term of at least 25 years. Neither guilty pleas alone nor
mitigating factors more generally, however, account for the lower sentences
imposed by the Tribunal, for example, those of Serushago (15 years), Ruggiu
(12 years), Elizaphan Ntakirutimana (10 years) and Rutaganira (6 years).
The latter three pled guilty to secondary or indirect forms of participation,
which generally attract lower sentences than those imposed on principals.85
82 Judgment, Kayishema and Ruzindana (ICTR-95-1), Appeals Chamber, 1 June 2001, xx351, 354.
83 In the same case, the Appeals Chamber chose not to consider Kayishema’s claim that his
repeated assertions of innocence and introduction of an alibi defence could not be deemed
aggravating ç for, the Chamber said, even if the Trial Chamber erred in this regard, that
would not affect Kayishema’s sentence. Ibid., xx362^363. But, here too, the Appeals Chamber,
in my view, should have taken the opportunity to clarify that, as a matter of due process,
a defendant should not be affirmatively penalized for insisting on the presumption of
innocence and his right to a trial, or for putting on a viable defence. (Of course, he might be
penalized at sentencing for perjury nonetheless; and an assertion of innocence may well
rule out certain mitigating factors, e.g. cooperation, acceptance of responsibility, remorse.
But precision in the characterization of these circumstances is vital to due process.)
84 Judgment and Sentence, Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Trial Chamber, 4 September 1998, x56.
85 Judgment and Sentence, Ntagerura, Bagambiki, and Imanishimwe (ICTR-99-46), Trial Chamber,
25 February 2004, x813; Judgment and Sentence, Semanza (ICTR), Trial Chamber, 15 May 2003,
x 563.

730

JICJ 5 (2007), 713^734

Still, while it may be impossible precisely to quantify the value or role of
mitigating circumstances, a brief review of two of these cases offers insight
into the relative merits and limits of the Tribunal’s approach.
Consider first Serushago, an Interahamwe leader in Gisenyi, who pled guilty
as a principal to genocide and crimes against humanity for murder, extermination and torture86 ç crimes that would ordinarily be expected, in view of
the Tribunal’s practice in comparable cases, to carry a life sentence.
But Serushago voluntarily surrendered before even being indicted, pled guilty
and offered ‘substantial and ongoing’ cooperation to the Prosecution, which
enabled several arrests and included his agreement to testify against others in
the future.87 At trial, he expressed remorse and contrition in a manner that the
Tribunal found sincere. Combined with his relatively young age, 37, this
suggested rehabilitative potential.88 The Tribunal also found that Serushago
assisted some Tutsis at risk during the genocide and that his political and
family background, including strong ties between his father and deceased
President Habyarimana, made it more understandable that Serushago would
become involved with the Interahamwe.89 Serushago, in short, benefited
from virtually every mitigating factor considered by the Tribunal except
for clemency factors such as old age or frail health. The Tribunal, finding
‘exceptional circumstances in mitigation’ sentenced him to only 15 years.90
Genuine remorse and the potential for rehabilitation, which international
human rights instruments consistently emphasize as the paramount purpose
of punishment,91 should, I believe, be considered in appropriate cases ç for
example, that of Erdemovic¤, who acted under duress and expressed clear and
sincere remorse for his conduct.92 But Serushago may well be a lesson in
the human limits to the Tribunal’s ability to assess sincerity and genuine
rehabilitative potential. Notwithstanding what can only be regarded as an
exceptionally light sentence for genocide and crimes against humanity,
Serushago appealed, arguing that the Trial Chamber failed to give due
weight to mitigation.93 It may, nonetheless, have been correct to give
86
87
88
89
90
91

Sentence, Serushago (ICTR-98-39), Trial Chamber, 5 February 1999, xx4^5, 25.
Ibid., xx31^35.
Ibid., xx39^41.
Ibid., xx36^38.
Ibid., x42.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 19 December 1966, Arts 6(2),
6(5)^(6), 10(3), 999 UNTS 171; see also Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res. 44/128, Annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, UN
Doc. A/44/49 (1989); American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, Arts 4(2)^(5),
5(6), 1114 UNTS 123; Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Art. 58, UN Doc.
A/CONF/611 (1957), Annex 1, ESC Res. 663C, 24 UN ESCOR Supp. No. 1, UN Doc. E/3048,
amended by ESC Res. 2076, 62 UN ESCOR Supp. No. 1, at 35, UN Doc. E/5988 (1977); Protocol
No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 28 April 1983, Euro. T.S. No. 114.
92 Judgment and Sentence, Erdemovic¤ (IT-96-22), Trial Chamber, 5 March 1998.
93 Reasons for Judgment, Serushago (ICTR-98-39), Appeals Chamber, 5 February 1999, x 6.
The Appeals Chamber rightly found this contention meritless and the comparison to
Erdemovic¤ inapt. Ibid., xx 21^27.
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Serushago a substantial sentence reduction (though probably not quite as
substantial as he received). As a practical matter, pleas save the Tribunal
much-needed resources, time and effort,94 and offer indispensable incentives
to future defendants to cooperate in the prosecution of others, particularly the
most culpable architects and leaders bearing the greatest responsibility for
large-scale human rights atrocities.95 But in most cases, the Tribunal should
dispense with the Pollyanna-ish view of pleas as indicators of sincere contrition
and recognize that, as in the national context, they generally reflect rational
calculation, not genuine moral conversion or repentance.96
Ntakirutimana illustrates the Tribunal’s emphasis, arguably misguided in that
case, on clemency factors and prior good character or acts. Elizaphan
Ntakirutimana, a senior pastor at the Mugonero Complex, betrayed his
parishioners, some of whom had actively sought his help during the genocide,
by ferrying ge¤ nocidaires to their safe haven, pointing out Tutsi refugees
attempting to flee, and encouraging and inciting the attackers to kill them.
The Tribunal convicted him of genocide but sentenced him to only 10 years.97
In mitigation, it found relevant that, before the genocide, Ntakirutimana had
led an ‘exemplary life as a church leader, a highly religious and tolerant person’
and opined that he should therefore be viewed as ‘essentially a person of good
moral character until the events of April to July 1994 during which he was
swept along with many Rwandans into criminal conduct’.98 Furthermore,
the Chamber noted his old age, 78, and frail health, which it deemed ‘important
mitigating circumstances.’99
While a 10-year sentence for a 78-year-old man in poor health may well be
the practical equivalent of a life sentence, the idea that Ntakirutimana’s
prior good character should be a mitigating circumstance is quite dubious.
Unlike the thousands of poor, uneducated, rank-and-file ge¤ nocidaires
who were ‘swept along . . . into criminal conduct’, Ntakirutimana, by virtue of
his status, education, and religious and moral leadership, could have
and should have resisted the tide; his prior ‘character’ and ‘exemplary life’,
that is, would seem to render him more, not less, culpable. Furthermore,

94 The Tribunal’s severely limited resources prevent it from trying more than a tiny fraction of the
thousands of perpetrators, and as a matter of policy, it focuses on those deemed the most
culpable. See Morris, supra note 33.
95 This does not mean that a guilty plea must always warrant sentence reduction. Given the
gravity of his crimes and the extent of his responsibility, the Tribunal, rightly in my view,
sentenced Kambanda, prime minister of the interim regime, to life despite his plea. Judgment
and Sentence, Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Trial Chamber, 4 September 1998, x61.
96 This kind of judgment may have been more justified in Ruggiu. See Judgment and Sentence,
Ruggiu (ICTR-97-32), Trial Chamber, 1 June 2000, xx53^55 (opining that Ruggiu’s plea, beyond
sparing the Tribunal ‘time, effort, and resources’, ‘reflects his genuine awareness of guilt’ and
‘illustrates the beginning of repentance’); see also ibid., xx69^72.
97 Judgment and Sentence, Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17),
Trial Chamber, 21 February 2003.
98 Ibid., x895.
99 Ibid., x898.
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rather than acknowledge guilt and repent, as one would expect were his
conduct during the genocide an aberration from genuine religious
commitment, he fled to the United States and fought extradition.100 A
10-year sentence, even if the practical equivalent of a life sentence, fails
to ‘duly express[] the outrage of the international community at [his]
crimes.’101

D. The Role of the Appeals Chamber
Article 24(2) of the Statute authorizes the Appeals Chamber to ‘affirm, reverse
or revise’ decisions of the Trial Chambers, including sentences. But because
of the discretionary, fact-intensive nature of sentencing and the ‘overriding
obligation [of the Trial Chambers] to individualise a penalty to fit the
individual circumstances of the accused and the gravity of the crime’, the
Appeals Chamber does not review sentences de novo.102 It will revise
a sentence only if the Trial Chamber commits ‘discernable error’, on which the
appellant bears the burden of proof.103 While a Trial Chamber must consider
all mitigating circumstances, ‘whether a Trial Chamber gave due weight to any
mitigating circumstances is a question of fact’ to which the Appeals Chamber
will defer.104 Consequently, to justify a revised sentence, the appellant
must establish not only error but ‘that the error resulted in a miscarriage of
justice’.105
Hence, even where the Appeals Chamber has reversed convictions or found
other errors in the Trial Chambers’ judgments, it has, with only three
exceptions, declined to disturb the actual sentences imposed,106 and in only
two of these cases ç appeals by the Prosecution ç did the revision reflect
disagreement with the Trial Chamber’s exercise of its sentencing discretion.
In Semanza, for example, the Appeals Chamber concluded that the defendant
‘ordered’ genocide and crimes against humanity (extermination) rather than,
as the Trial Chamber had found, merely aided and abetted their commission.107
It therefore held a 15-year sentence for aiding and abetting incommensurate
with Semanza’s true culpability as a principal and raised that sentence
100 Judgment, Ntakirutimana and Ntakirutimana (ICTR-96-10 & ICTR-96-17), Appeals Chamber,
13 December 2004, x565; see Ntakirutimana v. Reno, 184 F.3d 419 (5th Cir. 1999).
101 Judgment, Aleksovski (IT-95-14/1), Appeals Chamber, 24 March 2000, x185.
102 Judgment, Akayesu (ICTR-96-4), Appeals Chamber, 1 June 2001, xx 407^408; see also
Judgment and Sentence, Ruggiu (ICTR-97-32), Appeals Chamber, 1 June 2000, x34
(emphasizing the Trial Chambers’ ‘unfettered discretion to evaluate the facts and attendant
circumstances [and] to take into account any other factor that they deem pertinent’).
103 Judgment, Semanza (ICTR-97-20), Appeals Chamber, 20 May 2005, x312.
104 Reasons for Judgment, Serushago (ICTR-98-39), Appeals Chamber, 6 April 2000, x22; see also
Judgment, Kambanda (ICTR-97-23), Appeals Chamber, 19 October 2000, x124.
105 Reasons for Judgment, Serushago (ICTR-98-39), Appeals Chamber, 6 April 2000, x22.
106 E.g. Judgment, Rutaganda (ICTR-96-3), Appeals Chamber, 26 May 2003, x592 [no revision of
Trial Chamber’s sentence warranted despite over-turning of crimes against humanity
(murder) count].
107 Judgment, Semanza (ICTR-97-20), Appeals Chamber, 20 May 2005, x388.
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by 10 years.108 By sharp contrast, in Kajelijeli, despite vacating one count of
genocide and one count of crimes against humanity (extermination) and
finding that the Trial Chamber erroneously failed to take into account
a mitigating circumstance, the Appeals Chamber revised the Trial Chamber’s
sentence (from two life terms plus 15 years to a single fixed term of 45 years)
only because of the violation of Kajelijeli’s rights to be notified promptly
of the charges and brought speedily before a judicial officer for an initial
appearance.109 The Appeals Chamber’s reluctance to disturb sentences
despite legal error thus often seems to reflect the limits of a life sentence
to express proportional culpability in the context of a genocide; after
correcting all the errors, a defendant may merit one life sentence rather
than three, but absent a system of parole, there is, of course, no practical
difference.

4. Conclusion
The ICTR, for better or worse, represents principally the interests and values
of the amorphous international community rather than those of Rwanda,
the victims of the genocide or any other local community. Its sentencing law
and practices perforce reflect this fact; hence the exclusion of the death
penalty despite Rwanda’s objections.110 It therefore should, to quote former
special rapporteur Doudou Thiam of the International Law Commission,
strive ‘to select penalties on which there is the broadest agreement and whose
underlying principle is generally accepted by the international community’.111
How well has it performed? The existing record, as this brief survey suggests,
is mixed. The ICTR has appropriately sentenced the principal architects
and orchestrators of the genocide to life imprisonment, while developing the
beginnings of a ‘common law’ of sentencing for serious international crimes
that will benefit future tribunals, not least the ICC. Yet its jurisprudence

108 Ibid., x389. This brought Semanza’s total sentence to a term of 35 years in prison. See also
Gacumbitsi (ICTR-2001-64), Appeals Chamber, 7 July 2006, x205 (concluding that ‘in light of
the massive nature of the crimes and the Appellant’s leading role in them, as well as the
relative insignificance of the purported mitigating factors, the Trial Chamber ventured outside
its scope of discretion by imposing a sentence of only thirty years imprisonment’ and therefore, increasing Gacumbitsi’s sentence of life imprisonment).
109 See Judgment, Kajelijeli (ICTR-98-44), Appeals Chamber, 1 December 2003, xx310^311,
316^319, 323^324. In Barayagwiza, the Trial Chamber similarly reduced the defendant’s sentence (from a life term to 35 years’ imprisonment) as the only means to implement the Appeals
Chamber’s earlier finding that Barayagwiza’s speedy trial rights had been violated. Judgment
and Sentence, Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze (ICTR-99-52), Trial Chamber, 3 December
2003, x1107.
110 See Alvarez, supra note 3, at 409^410 (emphasizing that the ICTR has privileged international
goals ‘over the desires of many of those who have been most immediately affected by the
genocide’).
111 Schabas, supra note 5, at 175^176 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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suffers from the continuing tendency to regard the sentence as something of
an ‘afterthought’.
In terms of procedure, the ICTR, like the ICTY, abandoned sentencing hearings early in its existence based on considerations of expedience and cost.112
This is unfortunate, for the absence of a distinct sentencing phase, and the
attention to sentencing it enables, impedes the growth of a mature jurisprudence ç one of the most significant international values that ad hoc international criminal tribunals, given political and resource constraints, can
realistically serve. Failure to hold a distinct sentencing hearing also inhibits
the expressive value of sentencing, and, as a number of writers point out,
threatens the due process rights of defendants at trial.113 Greater attention to
the sentencing process would therefore, I believe, not only be feasible, but
would meaningfully contribute to the ICTR’s mission and long-term significance as it strives to complete its work by 31 December 2010.114
112 S.D. Murphy, ‘Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia’, 93 American Journal of International Law (1999) 57^97, at 92.
113 W.A. Schabas, ‘A rticle 76: Sentencing’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court: Observers’ Notes, Article by Article (Baden-Baden: Nomos,
1999), 981^982; Beresford, supra note 42, at 51^52.
114 See D.A. Mundis, ‘The Judicial Effects of the ‘‘Completion Strategies’’ on the Ad Hoc
International Criminal Tribunals’, 99 American Journal of International Law (2005) 142^158,
at 143 and n. 6; see also SC Res. 1534, 25 March 2004, x3.

